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Labour market policies settled at national level imply a “one-size-fits-all” labour market strategy. This strategy 
might not sufficiently take into account region-specific economic structures. We employ a panel factor-augmented 
vector autoregression (FAVAR) to evaluate whether active labour market programmes (ALMPs) might 
asymmetrically affect labour markets at regional level in a data-rich environment. The paper focuses on Italian 
regions. Our results suggest that while in the South employment is mainly driven by social and economic context 
variables, in the North the employment dynamics is significantly explained by policy interventions. Finally, we 
suggest two main policy implications. First, the success of active policies depends on the regional labour market 
conditions. Second, policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure 
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1 Introduction 
This paper explores the role that active labour market policies (henceforth ALMP) set at 
national level might have on regional labour market performance. The hypothesis underlying our 
empirical investigation is that, given the dualistic economic structure of the Italian regions, ALMP 
might produce asymmetric effects on regional labour markets. More specifically, ALMP may 
asymmetrically influence the matching process as well as the labour market equilibrium conditions 
at a regional level. 
Government expenditure on labour market policies (LMPs) can be divided into two categories, 
active and passive. Passive policies include payments of unemployment benefits in the form of 
unemployment insurance or social assistance. ALMPs are, instead, policy interventions targeting 
certain sub-groups on the labour market, aiming to activate the unemployed to enhance 
employability.  
From a theoretical point of view the effects of ALMPs can be analysed by evaluating their 
impact on the equilibrium relationship between unemployment and vacancies within a model of job 
search and matching, i.e. the Beveridge Curve framework. This curve represents a negative 
relationship between unemployed workers and the number of unfilled jobs (vacancies). More 
precisely, the Beveridge Curve1 can be viewed as the result of a process in which workers and firms 
engage in a costly search, due to informational or locational imperfections, to find each other. The 
key argument is that the “matching function” (e.g. Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001) describes the 
ways the match between unemployed workers and unfilled jobs takes place; the behaviour of 
workers in searching for a job; the behaviour of employers in screening applicants for a vacancy 
and the probability that the job contact takes place.  
The determinants of the matching function influence the position and the slope of the 
Beveridge Curve. The slopes depends on the search intensity of job seekers and on labour market 
mismatches, while the job finding rate, hence the equilibrium condition, also depends on the 
decision of a job seeker to accept a job and on the employer’s acceptance decision (e.g. Shimer, 
2005; Yashiv 2006).   
However, other key variables influencing the equilibrium condition are those factors resulting in 
skill, sector and regional mismatches. Several authors (Armstrong and Taylor 2000; Jones and 
Manning, 1992; Gorter and Van Ours, 1994; Dixon et al. 2010) have applied the Beveridge curve 
                                                 
1 The theoretical foundations of the Beveridge Curve are substantially twofold: the first, starting from the 
Hansen model (Hansen, 1970; Holt and David, 1966), derives the matching function from an aggregation 
over distinct markets in the presence of frictions and of limited mobility of labour. More recently, an 
alternative approach was developed which arises from a matching function combined with job search 
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).  
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framework to regional studies, seeking to verify the extent to which the different regional rates of 
unemployment could be explained by differences in labour market imperfections, as opposed to 
differences in effective demand. The main idea is that movements in the Beveridge curve may be 
partly explained by changes in the cross-region dispersion of employment growth. Indeed, if labour 
demand is growing in some parts of the country while shrinking in others, a regional mismatch may 
take place. As a consequence, in order for the unemployed to be matched with available vacancies, 
they should move across regions. This costly and time-consuming reallocation mechanism delays 
the job-matching process and increases the probability of high levels of both unemployment and 
vacancies. And the higher these barriers, the more diverse are the matching equilibrium conditions 
and hence the slope and position of the curve in the different regions.  
The position and slope of the Beveridge curve are also significantly affected by active labour 
policies (Jackman et al. 1990). More active than passive labour policies cause the Beveridge Curve 
to shift inward since they reduce labour market mismatches and search frictions. Nevertheless, the 
final effect of ALMPs on regional labour market tightness could be heterogeneous and uncertain.  
Despite many empirical evaluation studies no clear-cut cross-country evidence exists on the 
determinants of ALMP effectiveness. In general, microeconometric evaluation studies have found 
that ALMPs have at best a modest impact on participants’ labour market prospects. Their success 
depends on the type and duration of the program, the characteristics of the participants, and the 
evaluation methodology. Analysing cross-country evidence on the effectiveness of specific 
programmes on different target groups, Heckman et al. (1999) give a detailed overview of several 
microeconometric evaluation studies. They conclude that labour market programmes have a minor 
effect on labour market performance. Furthermore, they find considerable heterogeneity in the 
impact of such programmes.  
Using meta-analysis, Kluve (2010) evaluates the effect of 137 different studies on programme 
evaluation from 19 countries. His results suggest that it is almost exclusively the programme type 
that seems to influence the effectiveness of the active measures. While the effectiveness of direct 
employment programmes in the public sector seems to be very low, wage subsidies and job search 
assistance are the top performing policies. The effect of training programmes, which represent the 
most widely used type of active policy, on labour market participants is not very large. These results 
are in line with that obtained in Card et al. (2009) where it was also found that ALMP programmes 
do not seem to have differential effects on men versus women. 
While microeconometric evaluation studies aim to analyse the likely effects that a particular 
programme might have on individuals, macroeconomic studies are usually employed to evaluate the 
effect of the ALMP on aggregate employment or for the economy as whole. There are two 
alternatives to consider: whether ALMPs positively affect both unemployment and output, or 
whether the effect is simply distributional, that is, whether work is shifted from the old to the   4
young or from one region to another (Bellman and Jackman, 1996). In general this literature 
stresses that, when taking into account not only the direct effects on participants but also the 
indirect effects on non-participants, negative effects (like displacement, deadweight and substitution 
effects) may worsen the labour market outcomes
2.  
This framework has been used by several studies based on OECD data which explain the 
cross-country variation in unemployment rates by the cross-country variation in a number of 
labour market institutions; one of them is the ALMP (Layard et al., 1991; Nickell and Layard, 
1997; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). 
Recently, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of the macroeconomic effect of 
specific programmes of active labour policies using regional data (Hujer et al., 2006; Fertig et al., 
2006; Puhani, 2003). Most of these studies estimate an augmented Beveridge curve and find mixed 
results regarding the effects of the ALMP on labour market performance.  
However, there are few studies focusing on whether regional disparities might influence the 
effectiveness of the ALMP. Gerfin and Lechner (2002), for example, analyse several active labour 
market measures adopted in Switzerland during the 1990s. Despite highlighting the considerable 
differences in youth unemployment rates between the German-speaking cantons and the non-
German-speaking cantons as well as the strong regional heterogeneity in the programme’s 
allocation process, the authors mainly focus on partial-equilibrium effects of the ALMP. Using data 
from administrative unemployment and social security records they find that whereas traditional 
employment programmes negatively affect labour market performance, a wage subsidy for 
temporary jobs has a significant positive effect. 
Following Warren’s seminal paper (1991), several authors such as Fahr and Sunde (2006), and 
Ilmakunnas and Pesola (2003) apply a stochastic production frontier approach to model the 
matching process at regional level. Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) adopt a similar approach to 
evaluate the impact of a labour market reform in Italy (the so-called Treu Reform of 1996) on the 
unemployment-vacancy relationship across regions. They find the existence of a substantial 
difference in the matching efficiency between the southern and northern regions. 
In Italy, although the institutional setting may differ little between southern and northern 
regions there are substantial economic differences between the two parts of the country. 
Nevertheless, evaluation to date has been mainly carried out using the conventional micro-oriented 
approach to policy evaluation3.  
                                                 
2  See Altavilla and Caroleo (2006b). For a review of the debate on the evaluation of the effects of the ALMP 
on labour markets see: Kluve et al. (2006); Kluve (2010); Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstròm (2001); Caliendo 
et al. (2008), Büttner and Prey (1998). 
3 For a comprehensive survey of the evaluation studies carried out in Italy, see Trivellato et al. (2003) and 
Trivellato (2009).   5
The present paper investigates to what extent regional labour markets in Italy might be 
asymmetrically influenced by labour policy measures that ignore differences in regional economic 
structures. The method chosen to evaluate ALMPs in Italy is a dynamic multivariate panel model 
which enables estimation of the net effects of ALMP participation on employment or 
unemployment in a regional framework.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts. Section 
3 reports the empirical findings and discusses the effects of an ALMP shock on labour market 
variables. Section 4 focuses on regional policy implications. Section 5 summarizes the paper's main 
findings and concludes.  
 
2 Stylized facts 
Since the mid 1970s, most OECD countries have progressively shifted resources from passive 
income support, like unemployment benefits, to activation measures. In general, expenditure on 
ALMPs increased over the 80s and 90s with a peak in the mid 90s when countries reacted to high 
unemployment levels that persisted after the recession of the early 90s. Lower unemployment levels 
during the following decade have been accompanied by a decrease in the share of GDP devoted to 
ALMPs. In Europe, the increase in ALMP expenditure has been significantly influenced by the 
establishment of the European Employment Strategy (EES). This strategy has stressed the 
importance of the interaction between active and passive policies in influencing labour market 
outcomes4. In EU countries, ALMP design varies considerably depending on the specific country 
characteristics and the period when such programmes are implemented.  
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of GDP devote to LMPs following the classification used by 
Eurostat. Labour market interventions are divided into three main categories: LMP services (grey 
bars in the right-hand figure), LMP measures (black bars in the right-hand figure) and LMP support 
(black bars in the left-hand figure). While the first two categories refer to active policies, the last 
includes the expenditure on passive interventions. 
A very heterogeneous picture emerges. Few countries spent more than 1% of GDP on ALMPs 
in 2008. Moreover, in most countries passive policies absorbed a higher percentage of GDP. The 
countries with the highest and lowest ALMP expenditure are Belgium and Estonia, respectively. 
Other countries to record significant proportions of ALMP expenditure include Denmark (1.21%), 




                                                 




Figure 1: Public Expenditure on LMP as a percentage of GDP, 2008 
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 Source: Eurostat, LMP database 
 
 
The heterogeneity in ALMP spending is even greater when looking at the period 2004-2008 
(Table 1). The standard deviations as well as the average ALMP expenditure among countries (the 
last two rows) decrease over the five years considered in the table. This general pattern is most 
probably due to the global financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2007: during the 
recession there was a tendency to reduce the ALMP in favour of LMPL support. Indeed, expenses 
on activation measures decreased for almost all EU countries. Only in Belgium did expenditure on 
activation measures during the crisis remain substantial, one of the highest among OECD 
countries. Most countries reacted to the crisis by stepping up passive measures rather than 
increasing ALMP. 









Table 1: Spending on Active Labour Market Policies (Percentage of GDP) 
 
2 0 0 42 0 0 52 0 0 62 0 0 72 0 0 8
EU-27 : 0.51 0.50 0.45 0.46
EU-15 0.61 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.47
Belgium 0.87 0.91 0.95 1.02 1.08
Bulgaria 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.31 0.26
Czech Republic 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10
Denmark 1.51 1.27 1.21 1.02 0.98
Germany 0.85 0.60 0.59 0.46 0.53
Estonia 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04
Ireland 0.51 0.49 0.47 0.48 0.54
Greece 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.14
Spain 0.55 0.53 0.56 0.56 0.53
France 0.72 0.66 0.68 0.68 0.60
Italy 0.54 0.48 0.41 0.37 0.36
Cyprus : : 0.06 0.08 0.07
Latvia 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.08
Lithuania 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.14
Luxembourg 0.36 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.33
Hungary 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.21
Malta : : 0.07 0.03 0.05
Netherlands 0.92 0.86 0.78 0.72 0.71
Austria 0.44 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.52
Poland : 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.47
Portugal 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.41
Romania 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06
Slovenia : 0.19 0.18 0.11 0.09
Slovakia 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.15
Finland 0.79 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.67
Sweden 0.97 1.06 1.11 0.87 0.64
United Kingdom 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Norway 0.65 0.62 0.47 0.45 0.42
Average 0.49 0.45 0.42 0.39 0.37
St. Deviation 0.37 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28  
 
 
In Italy, expenditure on ALMP as a percentage of GDP has decreased in recent decades, sinking 
as low as 0.36% in 2008. As shown in Figure 1, this percentage is lower than that observed for the 
majority of European countries. During the last fifteen years, the Italian labour policy strategy, 
following the recommendations of the EES, has changed substantially, especially regarding wage 
contracts and the ALMPs (Pirrone and Sestito, 2009; Altavilla et al. 2009).  
Until the early 1990s, the public authorities implemented extraordinary region-specific policies 
aiming to support the less developed southern regions. The main active labour measures were   8
regional-based financial incentives such as tax allowances or reductions in social security 
contributions for firms employing workers resident in disadvantaged regions. However, these 
incentives were considered not consistent with the European Union’s goal of job creation as they 
gave southern firms an unfair advantage over their competitors in other regions or other European 
countries. Consequently, as shown in figure 2, the Italian labour market authorities changed the 
composition of labour market policy expenditure by substantially down-sizing region-specific 
programmes. 
 
Figure 2: Labour market policy in Italy 
N
Active Policies Passive Policies Regional Financial Support
 
Source: Ministry of Labour 
 
In addition, with some reforms to the labour market (the so-called Treu Reform, Law no. 
196/1997, and the so-called Biagi Law no. 30/2003) and to public administration (the so-called 
Bassanini Law no. 15/1997) the policy strategy changed the institutional setting governing the 
labour market. On the one hand, short-term contracts (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007) and temporary 
work agencies were introduced to give more flexibility within otherwise rigid employment 
protection legislation. On the other, in line with the progressive decision-making decentralization of 
public administration, management of most active labour market policies was transferred to local 
institutions (Regions or Provinces). In particular, Italian regional and provincial authorities now 
organize public employment services and the regional training system, and determine specific policy 
measures in favour of disadvantaged groups (Altavilla et al. 2009).   
Management of passive expenditure and of the measures supporting hiring and training still 
remain the main expenditures made at a national level.  
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Table 2: Share of LMP expenditure by type of action in Italy, 2001-2008 
LMP Category Type of Action 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Services 1 Labour market services 0.05 0.14 0.39 0.54 0.65 0.53 3.30 3.07
0.00
Measures 2 Training 17.07 17.51 20.91 19.55 17.18 15.78 16.10 14.61
3 Job rotation and Job sharing - - - - - - 0.20 0.25
4 Employment incentives 24.98 32.84 28.69 21.13 18.23 18.14 13.30 12.37
5 Supported employment and rehabilitation 0.47 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.20 - -
6 Direct job creation 3.55 2.67 2.29 0.95 0.86 0.79 0.80 0.58
7 S t a r t - u p  i n c e n t i v e s 5 . 3 11 . 9 73 . 9 84 . 5 64 . 3 83 . 8 42 . 7 01 . 9 9
LMP measures (categories 2-7) 53.97 56.12 56.54 46.93 41.52 38.94 33.10 29.71
Supports 8 Out-of-work income maintenance and support 41.37 40.56 40.61 50.85 56.76 58.63 55.80 59.59
9 Early retirement 4.66 3.32 2.85 2.22 1.71 2.43 7.80 7.63
LMP measures (categories 8-9) 46.03 43.88 43.46 53.07 58.48 61.06 63.70 67.22
Total LMP expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
Source: Eurostat, LMP database 
 
 
In the empirical analysis, we focus on the period 1996-2007. The choice of sample period was 
motivated by two considerations. First, given the labour market reforms that took place in Italy in 
the mid 1990s, our sample period (1996-2007) allows us to evaluate ALMPs within a single policy 
regime. The Lucas critique (i.e. the statistical relationships that hold under one policy regime may 
not be relevant under another when variations in the explanatory variables arise from different 
policies) would otherwise apply and make our macroeconomic policy evaluation meaningless. 
Second, we have a severe data availability problem before 1995 for ALMPs and some other 
variables used in the analysis. 
During our sample period, expenditures on ALMP that are national-oriented allow us to answer 
our main research question: does a centralized labour market policy have heterogeneous effects on 
regional markets depending on the different economic environment? The Italian labour market is 
still characterised by considerable regional disparities. The well-known dualistic structure of the 
Italian economy largely reflects substantial differences in labour market indicators. Regional 
unemployment differentials among Italian regions, for example, have widened since the mid 1980s, 
especially between the leading northern regions and the less developed South. 
Changes in regional disparities as measured by a simple standardised variation index5 over the 
period 1995-2007, for the 124 variables used in the empirical analysis, are summarised in Table 3. 
The table synthesizes the data reported in column VI of the table presented in Appendix 1. For 
each category (column 2) several variables are grouped according to the order given in table A.1. A 
value greater than zero means that, on average, during the period 1995-2007 there was an increase 
                                                 
5 For each year the variation index is calculated as the ratio between the standard deviation and the mean of a 
given variable.    10
in regional disparities. Since for most variables the average variation index is positive, we can 
conclude that, over the period considered in the analysis, the volatility of the economic variables 
among regions has substantially increased.  
 
Table 3: Variation index for regional disparities 
Variables  Category  Mean Variation Index 
1-18  Social and economic context  3.0 
19-22  Crime  3.0 
23-27  Infrastructure  0.7 
28-30  Education  1.9 
31-34  Health   3.7 
35-51  GVA  0.8 
53-70  Hours Worked  1.7 
71-88  Investment  1.7 
89-106  Remuneration  3.7 
107-110  Imp./Exp.  3.8 
111-119  Financial Market  3.3 
120-124  Labour Market   4.1 
 
Note: The table reports the standardised variation index for the 124 variables 
used in the empirical analysis. Variables are grouped according to the order given 
in table A1. 
 
Although these disparities have been well-documented in both empirical and theoretical studies, 
labour market policies have been designed without a regional-specific orientation. We are now 
interested in analysing whether the consequence of this strategy has been a homogenous use of 
ALMP across regions.  
Table 4 reports the percentage of participant as share of total labour force in both the South and 
the North for the main policy interventions (classified by type of action). 
It clearly emerges that, during the sample period analysed in the paper, northern and southern 
regions have implemented an almost identical policy mix. In fact, the interventions they have made 
in order to boost the labour market performance are very similar. The strategy involves extensive 
use of recruitment incentives (more permanent than temporary) and training (more workplace 
training than apprenticeship). Other measures like job rotation and job sharing (measure 3), 
supported employment and rehabilitation (measure 5), and direct job creation (measure 6) have 
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Table 4: Percentage of labour force involved in different ALMP actions 
South North
Training
2.2 Workplace training 1.35 1.56
2.4 Apprenticeship 0.92 0.89
3 Job rotation and job sharing
3.2  Job sharing 0.003 0.001
4 Employment incentives
4.1 Recruitment incentives
4.1.1 Permanent 6.67 5.47
4.1.2 Temporary 0.86 1.07
4.2 Employment maintenance incentives 0.08 0.05
5 Supported employment and rehabilitation
5.1 Supported employment 0.17 0.22
6 Direct job creation 0.05 0.04  
 
Figure 3 describes for each region the percentage of participants in the two main active policies, 
i.e. training and employment incentives,6 as a share of total ALMP participants (relative to the 
labour force) over the entire sample period. This figure summarizes the sample distribution of the 
two interventions as share of total ALMP by using box-plots (also known as a box-and-whisker 
diagram). These graphs detect interquartile ranges (the box), medians (the line inside the box), the 
maximum and the minimum values (the whisker), and outliers of the two measures in both North 
and South. 
The figure suggests that over the sample period analysed in this study, Italian regions have used 
the same policy strategy. In particular, employment incentives schemes have interested almost 2/3 
of the workers that have participated in an active program. Participants in training programs have 
reached almost 20% of the total. The only exceptions are Aosta Valley and to a lesser extent 
Trentino Alto Adige, where the differences between training and employment incentives programs 






                                                 
6 We only consider these two policies because they account, on average, for more than 85% of the total 
ALMP participants. 
.   12
 



















































Note: The figure reports, for each region, the distribution of training and employment incentives as 
share of total ALMP over the sample period.  
 
 
In order to further investigate whether Italian regions have homogenously used ALMP we test 
the statistical significance of the difference with dummy variable regression models. 
Precisely, we estimate the following equations: 
t i o t i d ALMP , , ε α α + + = 1   (1) 
t i o t i d Incentives Employment , , _ ε γ γ + + = 1   (2) 
t i o t i d Training , , ε β β + + = 1   (3) 
Where the dependent variables are the share of participants in ALMP, Training and 
Employment incentives programs over the labour force for region i  (i=1,2,…20) at time t;  and, d 
is a dummy variable that takes value one if region i is in southern Italy and zero otherwise. The 
coefficients  1 α , 1 β  and  1 γ  capture the average difference in the dependent variables between 
northern and southern regions.    13
The results obtained with OLS are reported in Table 5.  
On average, southern regions use more employment incentives than northern regions (0.23). 
The opposite is true for the training programs (-0.4). Overall, the number of participants in ALMP 
as percentage of labour force is lower in the South (-0.16).  
Looking at the standard errors (s.e.) reported in the table we can evaluate whether these 
differences are statistically significant. The differences in ALMP and in the employment incentives 
programs are not statistically different from zero. The only significant difference is related to the 
training schemes. However, this result is completely driven by the value of Aosta Valley. In fact, 
when excluding Aosta Valley from the regression, the difference becomes not statistically 
significant: the value of  1 β  becomes 0.06 with a standard error of 0.07. In this case, also the fit of 
the model, as summarized by the R2, increases from 0.39 to 0.51. 
We can conclude that Italian regions have followed a common labour market strategy 
irrespectively of their economic structure peculiarities. This strategy, settled at national level, has 
induced region to follow policies that have not sufficiently taken into account the different 
characteristics of the regional labour markets.  
 
Table 5: Differences between South and North 
Variable Constant d R
2
ALMP 5.23 -0.16 0.56
s.e. 0.21 0.33
Employment Incentives 3.21 0.23 0.59
s.e. 0.13 0.20
Training 1.45 -0.40 0.39
s.e. 0.07 0.12  
 
 
3 Macro-econometric framework 
This paper aims to empirically evaluate whether the “one-size-fits-all” labour market strategy 
adopted by Italian policymakers during the last decade might generate asymmetries in the effect of 
ALMPs on regional labour market performance. Using a panel-factor augmented-vector 
autoregression (FAVAR) we estimate whether ALMPs might heterogeneously affect labour market 
variables at a regional level. The hypothesis underlying our empirical investigation is that, given the 
different economic structures characterizing the Italian regions, ALMPs might produce asymmetric 
effects on the performance of regional labour markets. 
We use a panel dataset of Italian regions, covering the period 1996:1-2007:4. The data are 
quarterly and are collected from ISTAT, SVIMEZ, Bank of Italy and CambridgeReg and the   14
Ministry of Labour7. The ALMP measure can either be defined as the expenditure (as a percent of 
GDP) on ALMP or the number of participants in ALMP programmes. In our empirical analysis we 
use the participants in programmes of active policies as a percentage of the labour force8.  
From inspection of the relationship between the employment rate and ALMP participants 
relative to the labour force over the entire sample period (Fig. 4) there emerges a positive 
relationship between ALMPs and employment rate. Indeed, regions with few participants in 
ALMPs, such as Puglia, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia, have lower employment rates. By contrast, 
regions with a higher employment rate, like Lombardy, Tuscany and Veneto, have a higher share of 
labour force participating in ALMPs9.  
          

































































Employment rate  
Note: Pie = Piedmont; Lom = Lombardy; T-A-A = Trentino-Alto Adige; Ven = Veneto; Fri = 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia; Lig = Liguria; E-R = Emilia Romagna; Tus = Tuscany; Umb = Umbria; 
Mar = Marche = Lazio; Abr = Abruzzi; Mol = Molise; Cam = Campania; Apu = Apulia; Bas = 
Basilicata; Cal = Calabria; Sic = Sicily; Sar = Sardinia. The solid line represents the regression 
line.  
 
The regression line (the solid black line in figure 4) suggests a mild and positive relationship 
between employment and ALMP participation. Of course, a linear correlation in no way indicates 
whether increasing the number of ALMP participants might have a causal effect on the 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for a detailed description of the variables used in the analysis and their sources. 
8 The exact relationship between expenses and participants in ALMPs is derived in Altavilla and Caroleo 
(2006a) and in Calmfors et al. (2001). 
9 Note that ALMP participation in Campania and Basilicata is high because the denominator of our policy 
measure (labour force) is relatively low.   15
employment rate. This is due to the reverse causation or endogeneity problem. Indeed, given that 
policymakers react to rising unemployment or other labour market problems with increased policy 
efforts, it becomes very difficult to distinguish the effect of policy measures on the labour market. 
Basically, expenditures on ALMPs may affect the employment rate, but the level of employment 
may equally affect spending on ALMPs. This problem represents the main issue a researcher faces 
when evaluating the effect of ALMPs with a macroeconomic model.  
Any empirical approach that intends to capture how an ALMP shock is transmitted to the 
labour market has to take this “reverse causation” relationship explicitly into account. The 
macroeconomic literature typically estimates these impacts using vector autoregressions (VAR). 
This framework estimates the effects of labour policy instrument shocks without, a priori, 
dismissing any of the potential correlations and causal relationships among the variables included in 
a model. However, VAR models usually contain a very small number of variables relative to the 
information set monitored by labour market authorities. The rationale for only utilizing a small 
subset of the available information in VARs is that these models lose degrees of freedom as more 
variables are added – the so-called ‘curse of dimensionality’. Therefore, our analysis builds on the 
factor augmented vector autoregressive (FAVAR) approach suggested by Bernanke et al. (2005). 
This approach uses factor extraction techniques to summarise the relevant information from a large 
set of time series10. Thus, the advantage of the FAVAR approach is that all potentially relevant 
information for policymakers can be taken into consideration. 
 
3.1 A panel FAVAR model 
The econometric model we use to evaluate the effect of ALMPs on labour market performance 
is a panel factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR). As stressed above, the choice 
of the model is motivated by two main reasons. First, FAVAR allows us to solve the endogeneity 
problem and then correctly identify the effect of an ALMP shock on labour market variables by 
imposing a set of exclusion restrictions. Second, FAVAR is a flexible model that identifies dynamic 
relationships among variables in a data-rich environment. Working with more than 120 time series 
would otherwise not be feasible. 
Given the significant difference between Italian regional economies we analyse two areas 
separately: we consider eight regions11 for Southern Italy and twelve12 for Centre-Northern Italy, 
and specify two different models accordingly. These two models share the same set of explanatory 
variables and are estimated over the same sample period.  
                                                 
10 The recent literature on factor models has solved the curse of dimensionality, allowing very large panels of 
data to be decomposed into a small number of common factors (Stock and Watson, 1998, 2002). 
11 The southern regions are Campania, Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily and Sardinia. 
12 The twelve regions are Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Liguria, Lombardy, Trentino-Alto-Adige, Veneto, Friuli-
Venezia-Giulia, Emilia Romagna, Marche, Tuscany, Umbria and Lazio.   16
We assume that k economic variables form a vector Y which describes the labour market policy 
transmission channel. More precisely, we assume that the vector  it Y (i=1,…n and t=1,….,T where n 
indicates the number of regions considered in the model and T the sample period considered in the 
analysis) contains the employment rate ( it E ), the participation rate ( it Part ), and the ratio between 
the number of participants in the ALMP and the working-age population ( it ALMP ). Following 
the standard approach, we could estimate the relationship among these variables by specifying a 
multivariate time series model such as a VAR. However, by analysing the dynamics governing the 
variables contained in it Y  we might not fully capture all relevant information. More specifically, in 
our case, we consider 120 additional time series13 for each region, collected in a vector  it X . These 
series are initially transformed to induce stationarity. Assuming that all additional information 
depends on m unobservable factors summarized in the vector F we can specify a FAVAR model 
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where  1 ( ) ....
p
p AL I AL AL =- - -  is a lag polynomial matrix of order p. For each region, the 
() 1 mk +´  vector of error terms  it e  is mean 0 with covariance matrix V. 
The above model cannot be directly estimated because of the non-observable factors. For each 
region, we assume that there exist some unobservable fundamental forces that affect the dynamics 
of the time-series belonging to the vector  it X  that can be summarized by m factors in the 
following observation equation: 
it it it XF e =L +   (5)
where L  represent the () mk n ´´  matrices of factor loadings while  it e is a mean-zero error vector 
representing the idiosyncratic component of  it X . Equation (5) is the factor representation of the 
data. Therefore the model consists of a transition equation (4) and an observation equation (5) 
similar to that proposed in Bernanke et al. (2005) and can be estimated by employing the two-step 
principal components procedure suggested in Stock and Watson (1998, 2002). 
                                                 
13 All variables considered in the factor analysis and their transformations are reported in Appendix 1. When 
computing the common factors we do not consider the last two variables, the employment and participation 
rate, which are included in it Y .   17
The first step consists in estimating m unobservable factors  it F
)
 as the principal components14 
of all macroeconomic time series  it X . Following Bernanke et al. (2005), in order to identify the 
factors against any rotations we impose the following factor restriction15:  Z T Fit
) )
= , where Z
)
 
correspond to the eigenvectors of the m largest eigenvalues of  X X ′. 
In the second step, the FAVAR model described in equation (4) is estimated by standard 
methods, with  it F  replaced by  it F
)
 and an additional identifying assumption imposed. More 
precisely, model (4) is a reduced form VAR model, which contains a block recursive restriction that 
the unobservable factors do not respond to the ALMP shocks contemporaneously. A Choleski 
decomposition of the reduced form covariance matrix V is used to orthogonalize the reduced form 
innovations and to identify the structural model. We order the ALMP last and treat its innovations 
as labour policy “shocks”. This ordering imposes the identifying assumption that employment and 
participation rate do not respond to labour policy innovations within the quarter16. Note that this 
recursive order solves the endogeneity problem outlined above. The timing of the model can be 
summarized as follows: a shock to labour policy instruments in period t affects the employment 
rate at time t+1. In fact, at time t the employment rate is predetermined, and hence cannot be 
influenced by any policy instrument. For example, an increase in active labour policy increases 
labour force participation, thereby facilitating an increase in the employment rate. 
In principle, once we have recovered it F
)
, the panel FAVAR model can be estimated either 
under the null of homogeneity, using a fixed effects estimator, or under the alternative of 
heterogeneity of slope coefficients, i.e. using the mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith 
(1995). 
The mean group estimator allows coefficients and error variances to vary across regions and 
estimates (4) separately for each region. By contrast, a pooled (or fixed effects) estimator assumes 
that coefficients and error variances are homogeneous across regions, allowing only for region-
specific fixed effects. 
As discussed in Pesaran and Smith (1995), results are likely to vary significantly with respect to 
the estimation method, i.e. from the least restrictive, but potentially not efficient, mean group 
estimator, to the fixed effect estimator that only allows intercepts to vary across regions. We 
estimated the models with both techniques and compute a Haussman type test of the difference 
                                                 
14 The principal components are orthogonal linear combinations of the data that explain the maximal 
variances of the data contained in  it X . 
15 In fact, given the rotational indeterminacy problem, unless identification assumptions are imposed on the 
factor loadings, it will always be possible to find some rotation of the factors which explains the same amount 
of total variation in the data but implies a different set of factor loadings. 
16 We examine the robustness of the main results by adopting alternative identification schemes. Our results 
remain substantially unchanged.   18
between the two estimators. Under the null of homogeneity the test statistic is distributed as 
aχ
2 with  k+1 degrees of freedom where k  stands for the number of explanatory variables. 
Applying this test, we cannot reject the null of homogeneity in all estimated models. Specifically, we 
do not reject homogeneity in the model for the South (the statistics equals 3.17 with p-value 0.17) 
or for the North (the statistics equals 1.21 with p-value 0.75). We then estimate all models by 
assuming slope homogeneity. 
 
3.1 Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the two-step estimation procedure. We first concentrate on 
principal component analysis and then on the simulation of the FAVAR model. 
Figure 5 shows the outcome of principal component analysis by way of a scree plot which maps 
the largest twenty eigenvalues of the data matrix. There appears to be a natural break at the fourth 
value, with the remaining eigenvalues flattening out.  
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As shown in Table 6 the first four principal components explain on average 32%, 12%, 7% and 6% 
of the total variance in our economic series, making a cumulative proportion of 58%.  
 
Table 6: Principal component analysis 
   1st  PC  2nd PC  3rd PC  4th PC 
South      
Eigenvalue 39.45  15.85  8.49  7.29 
Variance Explained (%)  32.33%  12.99%  6.96%  5.98% 
Cumulative Var. Exp. (%)  32.33%  45.32%  52.28%  58.25% 
      
North      
Eigenvalue 38.52  15.71  8.65  7.16 
Variance Explained (%)  31.57%  12.88%  7.09%  5.87% 
Cumulative Var. Exp. (%)  31.57%  44.45%  51.54%  57.40% 
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Given the number of the time series included in the analysis, we consider this proportion 
sufficiently high. By contrast, the fifth and sixth components account for only 3% and 2%, 
respectively. We also employ the Bai and Ng (2002) procedure for determining the number of static 
factors and find that PC1 and IC1 criteria substantially support our choice of limiting our analysis to 
four principal components. 
Table 7 shows the percentage of variance in a given variable explained by all the factors, i.e. the 
communality17. The communality for a variable is the sum of squared factor loadings for that 
variable (row), and thus is the percent of variance in a given variable explained by all the factors.  
Table 7: Extracted communalities 
Variables  Category  South  North 
1-18  Social and economic context 0.71  0.62 
19-22  Crime  0.12  0.13 
23-27  Infrastructure  0.32  0.33 
28-30  Education  0.09  0.02 
31-34  Health   0.80  0.69 
35-51  GVA  0.55  0.54 
53-70  Hours Worked  0.53  0.47 
71-88  Investment  0.77  0.75 
89-106  Remuneration  0.43  0.45 
107-110  Imp./Exp.  0.84  0.88 
111-119  Financial Market  0.82  0.81 
120-124  Labour Market   0.85  0.88 
 
The table suggests that for both areas of the country the four extracted factors explain a high 
percentage of the variance of the variables summarizing the social and economic structure 
(variables 1 to 18), investment (variables 71 to 88), financial market (variables 111 to 119) and 
labour market (variables 120 to 124). The variance of other variables, mostly those related to crime 
and infrastructure, is less explained by the factors which are extracted, resulting in coefficients 
lower than 0.5. 
To explore what kind of interpretation could be assigned to the first four principal components, 
we employ an orthogonal rotation of the estimated eigenvectors using the varimax method. 
Varimax rotation seeks to maximize the variances of the squared normalized factor loadings across 
variables for each factor. This is equivalent to maximizing the variances in the columns of the 
matrix of the squared normalized factor loadings. 
                                                 
17 In complete principal component analysis, with no factors dropped, the communality is equal to 1.0, or 
100% of the variance of the given variable. As our model does not extract all the variance, the proportion of 
variance of a particular variable that is due to common factors is called the communality. The proportion of 
variance that is unique to each variable is then the respective variable's total variance minus the communality.   20
Table 8 depicts the rotated components. Categories again refer to the ordering of the series as 
reported in Appendix 1. The average principal component ‘loadings’ are shown in the columns 
from 3 to 6. Figure A.2 in Appendix 2 reports a detailed graph where variables are not grouped. 
The first rotated principal component is a linear combination that places heavy weights on regional 
economic series related to the social and economic context in both estimated models. The second 
rotated eigenvector clearly picks out the indicators associated with investment and hours worked 
for both south and north. 
 
Table 8: Loadings on selected principal components 
South                
Variables  Category  1st  PC  2nd PC  3rd PC  4th PC 
1-18  Social and economic context 0.7  -0.1  0.0  0.2 
19-22  Crime  0.16  -0.04  0.10  0.00 
23-27  Infrastructure  0.28  0.03  0.06  -0.12 
28-30  Education  0.07  0.03  -0.04  -0.07 
31-34  Health   0.79  -0.12  0.02  0.37 
35-51  GVA  0.57  -0.03  0.09  0.23 
53-70  Hours Worked  0.33  0.23  0.23  0.15 
71-88  Investment  -0.06  0.72  0.05  -0.05 
89-106  Remuneration  0.17  0.00  0.35  0.12 
107-110  Imp./Exp.  0.26  -0.04  -0.06  0.82 
111-119  Financial Market  0.51  -0.03  0.05  0.72 
120-124  Labour Market   0.43  -0.01  0.04  0.79 
        
North                
Variables  Category  1st  PC  2nd PC  3rd PC  4th PC 
1-18  Social and economic context 0.7  0.0  0.2  0.0 
19-22  Crime  0.23  0.05  0.08  -0.10 
23-27  Infrastructure  0.37  -0.01  0.04  0.15 
28-30  Education  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.06 
31-34  Health   0.61  -0.19  0.46  0.13 
35-51  GVA  0.49  -0.06  0.30  0.15 
53-70  Hours Worked  0.23  0.25  0.16  0.30 
71-88  Investment  -0.09  0.69  -0.04  0.09 
89-106  Remuneration  0.17  0.06  0.20  0.38 
107-110  Imp./Exp.  0.20  -0.05  0.88  -0.05 
111-119  Financial Market  0.36  -0.07  0.80  0.07 
120-124  Labour Market   0.36  -0.09  0.84  -0.01 
Note: Numbers in the first column refer to the ordering of the variables as reported in Appendix 1. 
Hence 1-18 social and economic context; 19-22 crime; 23-27 infrastructure; 28-30 education; 31-34 
health; 35-51 GVA; 53-70 hours worked; 71-88 investment; 89-106 remuneration; 107-110 
import/export; 111-119 financial market; 120-124 labour market  
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Interestingly, the third and fourth principal components for the south are very similar to the 
fourth and third components for the north. More precisely, the third component for the South and 
the fourth component for the North seem to be linked with remuneration. On the contrary, labour 
market variables and financial market indicators load highly on the third component for the North 
and the fourth component for the South. 
We can now describe how these factors could be used in a standard VAR for evaluating the 
effect of ALMPs on labour market performance. Once we have estimated the FAVAR we can 
compute the dynamic effects of ALMP shocks on labour market variables, examining in particular 
the similarity of employment responses in each area. This is accomplished by using impulse 
response functions with a structural decomposition of the variance covariance matrix explained 
above. A 32-quarter horizon is considered. The estimated responses to a 1% increase in ALMP are 
reported in Figure 6. Each response is provided with the associated asymptotic confidence bands.  
Impulse responses look reasonably well behaved and give rise to the usual hump-shaped 
dynamics. The figure shows that all response functions are statistically significant. Moreover, the 
impulse responses for the northern regions are substantially larger than those for the south. Most 
importantly, the results suggest that the employment rate in the selected regions responds to 
identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and movements, as well as with different 
magnitudes of the effects. 
Table 9 outlines some key characteristics of the estimated response functions. In particular, it 
gives information about the maximum impact and the average responses of the employment and 
participation rate to ALMP structural shocks. The table also considers the time that a shock takes 
to exert its maximum effect on employment and its cumulative effect. Despite some qualitative 
similarities, the existence of different responses across regions is suggested. In both areas, an 
ALMP shock produces an increase in the employment rate. However, the magnitudes of the effect 
are quite dissimilar. Whilst in the South the employment rate increases by more than 20 base points, 
an ALMP shock in the North raises the employment rate by 38 base points. 
The time-profile of the response functions is also significantly different. After an initial delay, 
the response function displays a hump-shaped pattern that reaches its maximum increase after 
roughly two years in the North and one year in the South. Asymmetries are also detected in the 
response of the participation rate. Again, the largest responses are observed in the North: in 
particular, the response of participation in northern regions reaches a maximum of 26 base points 
after eight quarters, while the reaction of the southern Italian regions is smaller and more rapid: 13 
base points after four quarters. 
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Figure 6: Responses of employment and participation rate to a 1% increase in ALMP 
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Table 9: Estimated response function features 
   South  North 
  Participation Rate Employment Rate Participation Rate Employment Rate 
Average Effect  0.051  0.1  0.15  0.22 
Cumulative Effect  1.641  3.216  4.809  7.049 
Maximum Effect  0.132  0.227  0.263  0.378 
Time to maximum  4  4  8  8 
 
These results might be interpreted as a measure of how effective ALMPs are in supporting job 
reallocation and boosting reemployment among dismissed workers in the two areas of the country.    23
Given the timing of our model, an exogenous ALMP shock is transmitted to employment 
through participation rate. As for most European countries (Decressin and Fatás, 1995), we find 
evidence that a policy shock has a strong effect on the participation rate in both South and North. 
The larger effect on participation rate in the northern regions means that in this part of the country 
an ALMP shock calls upon many more people outside the labour force to participate than in the 
south. In other words, although the size of shock is identical, the reaction to the shock is stronger 
in the north where more people enter the labour force. In the south, a smaller percentage of non-
participants enter the labour force to fill new jobs. 
The final effect on employment also depends on the level of job reallocation produced by the 
ALMP shock. As shown by the cumulative effect of the shock reported in table 9, this reallocation 
process results in a new equilibrium employment level above the initial value of the shock. 
However, the reallocation process associated with the ALMP shock in the North generates a larger 
amount of additional jobs than the same shock in the South. This means that in the North, the 
amount of search effort and, in turn, successful job reallocation significantly depends on the levels 
of ALMP which in turn speed up the transition into new jobs. The different magnitudes of the 
effect can also be explained by the differences in both the number of vacancies and that of 
unemployed in the two areas. Whilst the northern regions have a large number of vacancies and 
fewer unemployed, the South has fewer vacancies and a large number of unemployed. It follows 
that an identical increase in ALMP has a greater effect on the northern employment rate. 
Impulse response analysis also provides an answer to another important policy question: Are 
similar adjustment patterns observed for ALMP shocks in specific regions within Italy? The 
different adjustment speeds of employment rates to ALMP shocks reflect persistent differences 
between North and South. We do find substantial differences between Italian regions in terms of 
adjustment patterns to an ALMP shock. Table 9 and figure 6 show that the adjustment to a positive 
ALMP shock in the South is absorbed faster, and that the shock’s maximum effect is reached after 
one year. In the North it seems to take longer and then the cumulative effect on employment is 
higher. This evidence supports the view that the reallocation rate of unemployed workers and 
migration flows on the northern labour market are indeed much higher than in other parts of Italy. 
The responses of 11 selected variables to a 1% increase in ALMP at relevant horizons (Table 10) 
are largely in line with our a priori predictions. An increase in ALMP tends to reduce both the 
unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment. Moreover, GDP and investments positively 
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Table 10: Response of selected variables to a 1% shock in ALMP 
ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.01 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.002 -0.04 -0.03
8 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.001 -0.04 -0.04
12 0.02 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.04 -0.002 -0.03 -0.03
24 0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.004 -0.01 -0.01
ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.02 -0.001 -0.04 -0.05
8 0.02 0.11 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.06 0.02 -0.012 -0.05 -0.06
12 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.01 -0.021 -0.05 -0.05




Note: ESI = Firm start-up Index; GDP = gross domestic product; VCR = Legality condition Index; SSER = 
Secondary School Enrolment Rate; GVA = gross value added; HW = Total Hours Worked; IN = Total 
Investment; TR = Total Remuneration; FDIA = Foreign Direct Investment Attraction Index; UR = 
Unemployment Rate; LUR = Long-term Unemployment Rate. 
 
Our analysis now concentrates on the forecast error variance decomposition. The main strength 
of this type of analysis is its ability to capture the weight of different variable innovations on a given 
variable forecast error variance decomposition. In other words, it yields information on the 
percentage of variation in the forecast error of a variable explained by its own innovation and the 
proportion explained by innovations in other variables at different horizons.  
Table 11 depicts the forecast error variance decomposition of the variables in the FAVAR 
models estimated above up to a six-year horizon. The table gives useful information on the relative 
ability of ALMP to affect employment dynamics at different horizons. According to the variance 
decomposition at short horizons, ALMP innovations do not play a major role in the quarterly 
fluctuations of the employment rate. The dynamics of employment are largely dominated by its 
own shocks, and they indicate that short-run fluctuations in the employment rate display no 
association with active labour market programmes or with the dynamics of the participation rate. 
For long horizons, we find that both ALMPs and the participation rate have a certain influence in 
determining employment dynamics. This influence varies across regions: while in southern regions 
only 7% of employment movements are driven by ALMP shocks, in the North this percentage 
more than doubles (almost 16%). 
Table 11 also illustrates the percentage of variance explained by the estimated common factors. 
In the South, the first estimated component, which is related to the social and economic context, 
does significantly affect movements in the employment rate: after six years, it explains almost 19% 
of the employment change. In the northern regions, by contrast, employment dynamics seems to be 
partially explained by the dynamics of the fourth principal component (related to wage and hours 
worked): in particular, movements in the fourth PC after six years account for almost 20% of 
employment variation.   25
Table 11: Forecast-error variance decomposition 
1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 4th PC E Part ALMP
Employment
4 0.04 0.80 0.07 1.68 94.39 0.52 2.49
8 7.09 1.68 0.11 3.56 78.60 1.92 7.04
12 15.38 1.76 0.15 3.86 69.83 2.09 6.94
24 18.93 1.76 0.17 3.84 66.31 2.09 6.90
Participation
4 0.02 0.14 0.17 3.01 43.22 52.27 1.18
8 0.02 0.14 0.22 3.90 42.24 50.66 2.83
12 0.12 0.14 0.23 4.22 41.74 49.95 3.60
24 1.13 0.17 0.28 4.33 41.11 49.04 3.93
ALMP
4 0.47 0.28 0.50 1.20 1.94 0.21 95.41
8 2.48 0.64 0.79 1.53 1.44 0.43 92.70
12 3.92 1.14 1.04 1.49 1.41 0.51 90.50
24 4.08 1.28 1.12 1.48 1.40 0.53 90.10
1st PC 2nd PC 3rd PC 4th PC E Part ALMP
Employment
4 0.07 0.38 0.06 9.57 84.99 0.54 4.38
8 0.21 0.32 0.13 13.49 73.53 0.55 11.78
12 0.67 0.46 0.21 15.35 66.59 1.49 15.23
24 1.22 1.08 0.36 19.00 58.57 3.98 15.79
Participation
4 0.42 0.39 0.68 6.91 57.54 29.74 4.32
8 0.42 0.33 0.57 12.58 49.48 25.40 11.22
12 0.53 0.50 0.51 15.36 45.01 23.95 14.14
24 0.77 1.48 0.45 19.62 40.10 22.98 14.61
ALMP
4 1.16 0.85 0.05 0.25 0.06 7.22 90.42
8 3.03 1.21 0.23 0.49 0.05 16.33 78.66
12 3.95 1.68 0.50 0.53 0.12 21.34 71.89





We may conclude that there are different explanations for employment dynamics in the two 
areas. In the South neither ALMP nor the participation rate seems to account for changes in the 
employment rate: employment is driven by its own shocks in the short term and by social and 
economic context variables at longer time horizons. By contrast, in the northern regions, the 
employment dynamics is significantly explained by remuneration and hours worked. 
Finally, we report the fraction of employment rate, participation rate and ALMP explained by 
the eleven selected variables introduced above in table 12. In both models, the variable that exerts 
the largest influence on employment rate is the unemployment rate. Interestingly, while in the 
South the dynamics of ALMP is significantly driven by GDP and GVA movements (almost 10%), 
in the North changes in active labour market policies are explained by changes in the 
unemployment rate (about 13%). 
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Table 12: Forecast-error variance decomposition – other variables 
Employment ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.309 0.687 1.612 0.046 0.683 0.334 0.033 0.106 0.083 31.249 21.716
8 0.438 1.780 1.964 0.212 1.885 0.377 0.196 0.330 0.085 29.793 20.800
12 0.448 2.682 1.992 0.467 2.902 0.376 0.395 0.534 0.123 28.989 20.216
24 0.486 3.755 1.958 1.012 4.168 0.497 0.666 0.782 0.279 28.460 19.919
Participation ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.561 0.186 1.026 0.123 0.182 0.049 0.115 0.048 0.001 6.729 5.888
8 0.574 0.613 1.009 0.124 0.591 0.052 0.208 0.048 0.002 6.630 5.912
12 0.571 0.958 1.026 0.153 0.935 0.072 0.217 0.058 0.005 6.576 5.923
24 0.629 1.347 1.053 0.271 1.358 0.142 0.222 0.089 0.029 6.541 5.935
ALMP ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 1.149 2.626 0.105 0.236 2.159 0.250 1.353 0.591 0.251 0.225 1.065
8 0.856 5.097 0.319 1.142 4.432 0.894 2.269 0.493 0.625 0.294 2.242
12 1.079 7.188 0.526 2.304 6.452 1.699 2.946 0.657 1.056 0.365 2.774
24 2.440 9.967 0.802 4.385 9.381 2.831 3.760 1.055 2.142 0.426 3.115
Employment ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.015 0.484 0.025 0.225 0.503 0.064 0.188 0.085 0.032 31.605 11.887
8 0.031 0.614 0.074 0.387 0.644 0.095 0.990 0.188 0.042 27.711 9.998
12 0.082 0.762 0.128 0.437 0.802 0.455 1.990 0.235 0.044 24.599 8.929
24 0.231 0.966 0.216 0.446 1.036 1.523 3.273 0.227 0.056 22.283 8.019
Participation ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.045 0.163 0.001 0.137 0.230 0.341 0.231 0.139 0.182 0.478 2.046
8 0.056 0.132 0.016 0.306 0.188 0.408 0.255 0.234 0.461 0.716 2.176
12 0.104 0.123 0.043 0.347 0.189 0.500 0.463 0.284 0.627 0.669 1.990
24 0.228 0.148 0.100 0.369 0.245 1.231 0.963 0.278 0.837 0.806 1.882
ALMP ESI GDP VCR SSER GVA HW IN TR FDIA UR LUR
4 0.681 0.069 1.772 3.394 0.163 1.501 0.558 0.074 0.115 4.304 1.042
8 0.913 0.195 1.822 2.364 0.393 3.703 1.390 0.124 0.135 8.760 1.487
12 1.079 0.273 1.852 2.263 0.525 5.370 1.803 0.214 0.127 11.109 1.686




Note: ESI = Firm start-up Index; GDP = gross domestic product; VCR = Legality condition Index; SSER = 
Secondary School Enrolment Rate; GVA = gross value added; HW = Total Hours Worked; IN = Total 
Investment; TR = Total Remuneration; FDIA = Foreign Direct Investment Attraction Index; UR = 
Unemployment Rate; LUR = Long-term Unemployment Rate. 
 
 
In order to evaluate whether different policies might have a heterogeneous impact on regional 
economies we simulate the same model (equation 4 and 5) changing only the variable representing 
the policy instrument. All other variables remain the same. More precisely, we substitute the total 
participants in ALMP with participants in training and employment incentives programs. All policy 
variables are expressed as percentage of labour force. 
Table 13 presents the results. Both policies have a greater impact on northern labour market. A 
1% increase in training leads to a rise of 30 basis points in southern employment after 3 years. In 
the North, this result is reached after only one year, while after three years the effect is almost the 
double (0.61%). 
The results are very similar when looking at the reaction of the participation rate: the induced 
increase in training produces a 0.63% and 0.28% growth in the North and the South, respectively. 
This difference in the reaction is not reduced when evaluating the effect of employment incentives. 
A policy shock that increases (by 1%) employment incentives also exerts a greater effect on   27
northern employment (0.34) and participation (0.29) compared to the reaction of the same variable 
in the South (0.24 and 0.12 respectively). 
Overall, consistently with the aggregate measure of ALMP we have used in the benchmark 
model, also when considering specific policies, such as training and employment incentives, the 
reaction of northern labour markets is stronger and faster than the one in southern regions. 
 
Table 13: Responses of employment and participation rate to a 1% increase in Training and 
Employment Incentives programs 
Shock to  Years after shock Employment Rate Participation Rate Employment Rate Participation Rate
Training
1 0.12 0.04 0.30 0.36
2 0.25 0.17 0.51 0.57
3 0.31 0.28 0.61 0.63
Employment Incentives
1 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.14
2 0.18 0.07 0.28 0.25




  4 Policy implications 
Why might centralized ALMPs heterogeneously affect the regional labour market? Overall, the 
results obtained in the empirical analysis suggest two main policy implications.  
First, the success of active policies depends on the regional labour market conditions. More 
precisely, ALMPs are less effective in regions with poor labour market outcomes. We find evidence 
that the impact of ALMPs is increasing with the regional employment rate. Similar results were 
obtained in recent papers by McVicar and Podivinsky (2010) and Blien et al. (2010).  
There is much debate, but surprisingly little evidence, on the question of whether Active Labour 
Market Programmes (ALMPs) have differential effects depending on regional labour market 
characteristics. On the one hand, we might expect ALMPs to have greater impacts in “tight” labour 
markets because more and perhaps better job vacancies exist. On the other hand, ALMPs might 
have larger impacts in very depressed labour markets because the added value of such programmes 
is higher. Recent studies of East Germany, a natural benchmark for the Italian Mezzogiorno18, 
provide a rather pessimistic assessment of the overall effectiveness of ALMPs in less developed 
regions. Lechner and Wunsch (2009), for example, found that training programmes and two other 
employment programmes implemented in East Germany failed to increase the employment 
                                                 
18 Both Italy and Germany have major regional divides, with southern Italy and the eastern portion of 
Germany recording higher unemployment rates than the rest of the country.   28
chances and earnings of their participants. Wunsch and Lechner (2008) also conclude that in the 
very depressed labour market of East Germany, the effectiveness of ALMP is very low.  
Consistently, our results strongly suggest that regional structure and labour market conditions 
significantly reduce the effectiveness of the ALMP in southern Italian regions: the heterogeneous 
effects found at regional level suggest that these measures are only effective in regions characterised 
by efficient labour markets. The idea is that since active programmes aim to assist the unemployed 
to get back into work, their effectiveness crucially depends on the supply of job vacancies (Martin, 
1998). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, in our analysis, active measures in regions generating 
few vacancies (the southern regions) have been found relatively ineffective. 
In other words, the large disparities among Italian regions mirror a different functioning of 
regional labour markets. In the regions where there are many applicants for few vacancies and the 
markets face structural problems, employment incentives may not be effective in activating 
employment dynamics and production and are likely to become subsidies to the underemployed. By 
contrast, when there are few applicants for many vacancies, the matching function can be improved 
by boosting labour contracts and training. As a consequence, a “one-size-fits-all” labour market 
strategy that does not take such disparities into account produces asymmetric effects on regional 
economies.  
Second, policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure. In 
other words, when designing a labour market strategy, the economic context should be taken into 
account.  
Our analysis strongly suggests that contextual factors might play a crucial role in determining the 
appropriate programmes to be implemented. ALMP appears to differently influence employment in 
the North and South of Italy and produce a longer-lasting effect in northern regions. There are 
various explanations for labour market dynamics in the two areas. In the South, employment and 
participation rate are largely driven by their own shocks as well as by shocks in the socio-economic 
structure. By contrast, in the northern regions, employment and participation dynamics are 
significantly explained by active labour market programmes and by the variables related to the 
business cycle (such as hours worked and remuneration). Consistently with what suggested in Blien 
et al. (2010), we find that integrating an unemployed person into the labour market is much easier 
in regions where the unemployment rate is low. 
Therefore, our empirical findings highlight the importance of considering the regional economic 
structure when implementing ALMP.  
Overall, the results are in line with the adoption of a “New Regionalism” approach (Cook, 2008; 
and Cook et al. 2008) which stresses the crucial role played by regional and local economic 
development in designing institutional changes and policy strategies.    29
Active labour market policies could be more effective and efficient if their implementation is 
based on decentralised operational responsibility. In fact, as demonstrated above, when policies are 
centralized, regions tend to use a similar policy mix. Decentralisation might instead lead to a 
stronger adjustment of the policy mix to local economic structures. 
 
5 Conclusions 
Our study evaluated whether active labour market policies made at the national level generate 
asymmetric effects when regions have different economic structures. Using empirical analysis, we 
studied the possible asymmetries that the implementation of ALMPs might produce in regional 
labour market performance.  
The macroeconometric model employed to estimate the effect of ALMP on labour market 
variables is a panel FAVAR that exploits the relevant information from a data-rich environment. 
We first estimated the common factors of employment by principal components. Factor analysis 
suggests that for both areas of the country four factors explain a high percentage of the variance. 
These factors summarize variables related to the social and economic structure, investment, the 
financial market and the labour market.  
We then simulated the model to measure the dynamic impact of ALMPs on regional labour 
markets. The results suggest that the impulse responses for the northern regions are substantially 
larger than those for the South and, more interesting, the employment rate in the selected regions 
responds to identical labour policy shocks with different speeds and movements, as well as with 
different magnitudes of the effects. ALMPs appeared to influence employment and participation 
rate differently and produce a longer-lasting effect in northern regions. An exogenous ALMP shock 
is transmitted to employment through participation rate. Although the size of shock is identical, the 
percentage of non-participants entering the labour force that filled new jobs in the North is larger. 
The final effect on employment, which depends on the level of job reallocation produced by the 
policy shock, results in a new equilibrium employment level above the initial value of the shock. 
However, the reallocation process in the South generates a smaller amount of additional jobs than 
in the North. This means that in the North, the amount of search effort and, in turn, successful job 
reallocation significantly depends on the levels of ALMP which in turn speed up transition into new 
jobs. 
Finally, the forecast error variance decomposition yielded information on how various structural 
shocks affect the behaviour of each variable at different time horizons. This analysis showed that 
the short-term dynamics of employment are largely dominated by their own shocks, and no 
association with active labour market programmes or with the dynamics of the participation rate 
can be displayed. For long time horizons, we find that both ALMP and participation rate have a   30
certain influence in determining employment dynamics but this influence varies across regions. 
Employment movements driven by ALMP shocks are more than double in northern regions. 
Moreover, as regards the influence of different factors on the dynamics of the employment rate, we 
found that in the South the first factor, which is related to the social and economic context, 
significantly affects long-term movements in the employment rate. In the northern regions, by 
contrast, employment dynamics seems to be partially explained by the dynamics of the fourth factor 
(related to hours worked and remuneration). 
 We conclude that there are different explanations for labour market dynamics in the two areas. 
In the South, labour market indicators are largely driven by shock in the economic structure. By 
contrast, in the northern regions, employment and participation dynamics are significantly 
explained by active labour market programmes. 
Overall, our results highlighted that the large disparities among Italian regions mirror a different 
functioning of regional labour markets (each region might have a Beveridge curve that differs in 
terms of position and slope). As a consequence, a “one-size-fits-all” labour market strategy that 
does not take such disparities into account produces asymmetric effects on regional economies.  
Finally, we suggest two main policy implications. First, the success of active policies depends on 
the regional labour market conditions. As a consequence, policymakers should be very careful in 
promoting ALMPs in very depressed labour markets. In fact, depending on the characteristics of 
regional labour markets the effectiveness of these programs might significantly vary. Second, 
policymakers should adjust labour policy strategy to the regional economic structure. It follows that 
when designing a labour market strategy, the economic context should be heavily taken into 
account.   31
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Appendix 1: Variables used in the empirical analysis 
Transformation Code: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first difference; 3 – logarithm; 4 – first 
difference of logarithm; Sample: 1995-2007; Frequency: A - Annual; Q – Quarterly; VI: Average 
of the Variation Index over the period 1995-2007.        
 
Table A.1: Variables used in factor analysis 
   Short name  Description  Frequency Tran   F/S  VI  Source 
             
Social and economic context          
1  PCF  Percentage of Cooperative Firms  A  1  S  -2.1  Istat 
2  ESI  Firm start-up Index  A  4  S  6.6  Istat 
3  FBR  Firm Birth Rate  A  1  S  -8.1  Istat 
4  HIAI  Household Internet Access Index  A  4  S  19.1  Istat 
5 SURP  Solid urban waste recycled of total solid urban 
waste (%)  A 1  S  8.8 Istat 
6 CAPI  Index of Cultural Activity Participation (number 
of visitors per institution)   A 4  S  3.4 Istat 
7 CAPI2  Index of Cultural Activity Participation (number 
of visitors per km2)   A 4  S  3.0 Istat 
8 RDP  Research and Development employees per 1000 
inhabitants  A 1  S  -0.6  Istat 
9  NV  Number of volunteers (%)  A  1  S  -0.8  Istat 
10  TA  Tourism Intensity Index  A  4  S  -0.2  Istat 
11 ADR  Age  Dependency  ratio  A  4  S  -0.3 Istat 
12 ER  Elderly  Ratio  A 4  S  12.0  Istat 
13  RP  Number of Resident Permits  A  4  S  1.2  Istat 
14  RF  Number of Foreigners Resident   A  4  S  11.3  Istat 
15  GRA  Growth Rate in Agriculture  A  1  S  -2.6  Istat 
16 HE  Household Expenditure (Levels - 1995m Euro)  A 4  S  1.6  CambridgeReg 
17 VAT  Value Added Tax  A 4  S  1.3  Svimez 
18 GDP  GDP (Levels - 1995m Euro)  A 4  S  1.1  CambridgeReg 
             
Crime             
19  RPCI  Recorded Property Crime Index  A  4  S  1.7  Istat 
20  RVCI  Recorded Violent Crime Index  A  4  S  5.6  Istat 
21  CPPI  Crime Public Perception Index  A  4  S  -0.9  Istat 
22  VCR  Legality condition Index   A  4  S  5.6  Istat 
             
Infrastructure            
23  FRTI  Freight-Rail Transportation Index  A  4  S  0.3  Istat 
24  FTTW  Freight-Truck Transportation Weight  A  4  S  2.2  Istat 
25  FTTI  Freight-Truck Transportation Index  A  4  S  2.7  Istat 
26  RCI  Rail Commuters Index  A  4  S  -0.4  Istat 
27  PTC  Public transport commuters (%)  A  1  S  -1.2  Istat 
             
Households and education           
28  SSER  Secondary School Enrolment Rate  A  1  S  -1.9  Istat   36
29 SLSP  School-leavers at second year of secondary 
school of total secondary schools (%)  A 1  S  5.0 Istat 
30 SLFP  School-leavers at first year of secondary school 
of total secondary schools (%)  A 1  S  2.5 Istat 
             
Health             
31 SR  Smoker  Rate  A 1  S  1.0  Istat 
32  PCPHE  Public Healthcare Expenses per capita  A  4  S  4.8  Istat 
33  PHE  Public Healthcare Expenses (%)  A  1  S  3.1  Istat 
34  PCHE  Per capita Healthcare Expenses  A  4  S  6.0  Istat 
             
Gross Value Added          
35  GVA  Total GVA (Levels - 1995m euro)  A  4  S  1.2  CambridgeReg 
36 GVAA  GVA Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing (Levels - 
1995m euro)  A 4  S  0.0  CambridgeReg 
37 GVAEM  GVA Energy and Manufacturing (Levels - 
1995m euro)  A 4  S  0.0  CambridgeReg 
38 GVAME  GVA Mining and Energy Supply (Levels - 
1995m euro)  A 4  S  0.8  CambridgeReg 
39 GVAFBT  GVA Food, Beverages and Tobacco (Levels - 
1995m euro)  A 4  S  0.8  CambridgeReg 
40 GVATC  GVA Textiles and Clothing (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  -0.2  CambridgeReg 
41 GVAFC  GVA Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber and Plastic 
Products (Levels - 1995m euro)  A 4  S  0.3  CambridgeReg 
42  GVAE  GVA Electronics (Levels - 1995m euro)  A  4  S  1.2  CambridgeReg 
43 GVATE  GVA Transport Equipment (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  -2.0  CambridgeReg 
44 GVAOM  GVA Other Manufacturing (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  -0.5  CambridgeReg 
45  GVAC  GVA Construction (Levels - 1995m euro)  A  4  S  1.1  CambridgeReg 
46  GVAMS  GVA Market Services (Levels - 1995m euro)  A  4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
47 GVAWR  GVA Wholesale and Retail (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  0.2  CambridgeReg 
48 GVAHR  GVA Hotels and Restaurants (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  1.8  CambridgeReg 
49 GVATC  GVA Transport and Communications (Levels - 
1995m euro)  A 4  S  1.1  CambridgeReg 
50  GVAFS  GVA Financial Services (Levels - 1995m euro)  A  4  S  1.9  CambridgeReg 
51 GVAOMS  GVA Other Market Services (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  2.9  CambridgeReg 
52 GVANMS  GVA Non-Market Services (Levels - 1995m 
euro)  A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
             
Hours Worked             
53 HW  Total Hours Worked: (Hours Per Employee Per 
Week - Lfs Measure) 
A 4  S  2.4  CambridgeReg 
54 HWA  Total Hours Worked:  Agriculture, Forestry And 
Fishing  
A 4  S  2.3  CambridgeReg 
55 HWEM  Total Hours Worked: Energy And 
Manufacturing   A 4  S  0.2  CambridgeReg 
56 HWME  Total Hours Worked: Mining And Energy 
Supply   A 4  S  1.9  CambridgeReg 
57 HWFBT  Total Hours Worked: Food, Beverages And 
Tobacco  
A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg   37
58 HWTC  Total Hours Worked: Textiles And Clothing  A 4  S  1.8  CambridgeReg 
59 HWFC  Total Hours Worked: Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber 
And Plastic Products  
A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
60 HWE  Total Hours Worked: Electronics   A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
61 HWTE  Total Hours Worked: Transport Equipment   A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
62 HWOM  Total Hours Worked: Other Manufacturing   A 4  S  1.9  CambridgeReg 
63 HWC  Total Hours Worked: Construction   A 4  S  1.5  CambridgeReg 
64 HWMS  Total Hours Worked: Market Services   A 4  S  2.4  CambridgeReg 
65 HWWR  Total Hours Worked: Wholesale And Retail   A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
66 HWHR  Total Hours Worked: Hotels And Restaurants  A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
67 HWTC  Total Hours Worked: Transport And 
Communications 
A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
68 HWFS  Total Hours Worked: Financial Services    A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
69 HWOMS  Total Hours Worked: Other Market Services   A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
70 HWNMS  Total Hours Worked: Non-Market Services  A 4  S  1.5  CambridgeReg 
             
Investment            
71 IN  Total Investment (Levels - 1995m Euro)  A 4  S  1.6  CambridgeReg 
72 INA  Total Investment Agriculture, Forestry And 
Fishing 
A 4  S  1.7  CambridgeReg 
73 INAEM  Total Investment Energy And Manufacturing  A 4  S  0.7  CambridgeReg 
74 INME  Total Investment Mining And Energy Supply  A 4  S  -0.5  CambridgeReg 
75 INFB  Total Investment Food, Beverages And 
Tobacco   A 4  S  4.0  CambridgeReg 
76 INTC  Total Investment Textiles And Clothing   A 4  S  -0.1  CambridgeReg 
77 INFC  Total Investment Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber And 
Plastic Products  
A 4  S  0.4  CambridgeReg 
78 INE  Total Investment Electronics   A 4  S  1.5  CambridgeReg 
79 INTE  Total Investment Transport Equipment  A 4  S  2.2  CambridgeReg 
80 INOM  Total Investment Other Manufacturing   A 4  S  0.1  CambridgeReg 
81 INC  Total Investment Construction   A 4  S  5.2  CambridgeReg 
82 INMS  Total Investment Market Services  A 4  S  1.6  CambridgeReg 
83 INWR  Total Investment Wholesale And Retail   A 4  S  4.5  CambridgeReg 
84 INHR  Total Investment Hotels And Restaurants  A 4  S  3.0  CambridgeReg 
85 INTC  Total Investment Transport And 
Communications  A 4  S  3.6  CambridgeReg 
86 INFS  Total Investment Financial Services   A 4  S  -2.3  CambridgeReg 
87 INOMS  Total Investment Other Market Services  A 4  S  0.4  CambridgeReg 
88 INNMS  Total Investment Non-Market Services  A 4  S  2.5  CambridgeReg 
             
Remuneration            
89 TR  Total Remuneration (Levels - M Euro)  A 4  S  4.1  CambridgeReg 
90 TRA  Total Remuneration Agriculture, Forestry And 
Fishing  
A 4  S  2.0  CambridgeReg 
91 TREM  Total Remuneration Energy And Manufacturing  A 4  S  2.9  CambridgeReg 
92 TRME  Total Remuneration Mining And Energy Supply A 4  S  2.4  CambridgeReg 
93 TRFB  Total Remuneration Food, Beverages And 
Tobacco 
A 4  S  3.6  CambridgeReg 
94 TRTC  Total Remuneration Textiles And Clothing  A 4  S  3.0  CambridgeReg 
95 TRFC  Total Remuneration Fuels, Chemicals, Rubber 
And Plastic Products 
A 4  S  3.1  CambridgeReg 
96 TRE  Total Remuneration Electronics  A 4  S  3.0  CambridgeReg 
97 TRTE  Total Remuneration Transport Equipment  A 4  S  2.5  CambridgeReg   38
98 TROM  Total Remuneration Other Manufacturing  A 4  S  2.9  CambridgeReg 
99 TRC  Total Remuneration Construction  A 4  S  3.2  CambridgeReg 
100 TRMS  Total Remuneration Market Services  A 4  S  4.9  CambridgeReg 
101 TRWR  Total Remuneration Wholesale And Retail  A 4  S  4.8  CambridgeReg 
102 TRHR  Total Remuneration Hotels And Restaurants  A 4  S  4.9  CambridgeReg 
103 TRTC  Total Remuneration Transport And 
Communications 
A 4  S  3.5  CambridgeReg 
104 TRFS  Total Remuneration Financial Services  A 4  S  3.2  CambridgeReg 
105 TROMS  Total Remuneration Other Market Services  A 4  S  7.6  CambridgeReg 
106 TRNMS  Total Remuneration Non-Market Services  A 4  S  4.7  CambridgeReg 
             
Import/Export            
107  FDIA  Foreign Direct Investment Attraction Index  A  4  S  41.0  Istat 
108 EHPC  Export of high/increasing productivity products 
(% of total export)  A 1  S  0.6 Istat 
109 IEE  Intra-EU  Exports  Q  4  S  4.9  ISTAT 
110 EEE  Extra-EU  Exports  Q  4  S  4.8 ISTAT 
             
Financial Market          
111  CTC  Ratio of Credit to Total Credit  Q  1  F  2.5  Bank of Italy 
112  DTC  Ratio of Deposits to Total Credit  Q  1  F  2.9  Bank of Italy 
113  UCTC  Ratio of Unpaid Credit to Total Credit  Q  1  F  3.2  Bank of Italy 
114 NB  Ratio of Number of banks to Working-age 
Population  Q 1  S  4.9  Bank  of  Italy 
115  GC  Ratio of Granted Credit to Total Credit  Q  1  F  3.0  Bank of Italy 
116  CCTC  Ratio of Claimed Credit to Total Credit  Q  1  F  2.5  Bank of Italy 
117  IL  Interest rate on Loans  Q  1  F  2.9  Bank of Italy 
118  ID  Interest rate on Deposits  Q  1  F  3.2  Bank of Italy 
119  FI  Financial Intermediation Index   A  4  S  4.7  SVIMEZ 
             
Labour Market             
120 UR  Unemployment  Rate  Q 1  S  0.8  ISTAT 
121 LUR  Long-term  Unemployment  Rate  Q  1  S  2.8 ISTAT 
122 LF  Labour  force  Q 4  S  3.8  ISTAT 
123 ER  Employment  Rate  Q 1  S  0.8  ISTAT 
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Appendix 2: Detailed results on factor analysis 
In this appendix for each variable we report detailed results for communalities and factor loading. 
Tables 5 and 6 in the main text are obtained by averaging the values presented in these figures over 
the categories reported on the horizontal axis. 
















































































































































































































Note: Categories on the horizontal axis refer to the ordering of the variables as reported in Appendix 
1. Then, 1-18 social and economic context; 19-22 crime; 23-27 infrastructure; 28-30 education; 31-34 
health; 35-51 GVA; 53-70 hours worked; 71-88 investment; 89-106 remuneration; 107-110 









   40
 













































































Note: Numbers on the horizontal axis refer to the ordering of the variables as reported in Appendix 1. Then, 1-18 social 
and economic context; 19-22 crime; 23-27 infrastructure; 28-30 education; 31-34 health; 35-51 GVA; 53-70 hours 
worked; 71-88 investment; 89-106 remuneration; 107-110 import/export; 111-119 financial market; 120-124 labour 
market 
 